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Coping with institutional complexity: intersecting logics and dissonant visions 
in a nation-wide healthcare IT implementation project.1  
Raluca Bunduchi, Aizhan Tursunbayeva and Claudia Pagliari 
Abstract 
Purpose - Digital technology transformation projects are complex, lengthy and difficult to 
implement, often failing to meet their objectives. Research explains this failure in terms of 
competing institutional logics influencing actors’ responses to project demands, and points to 
multiple interpretations that actors collectively form about the organisational application of the 
technology – their “organising visions” - throughout the project.  This paper examines digital 
transformation projects from an institutional perspective to reveal the role that multiple logics 
and organising visions play in shaping the projects. 
Design/methodology/approach – The research adopts a qualitative single study approach, 
investigating a national programme aimed at delivering a unified Human Resource Information 
System (HRIS) across a national public health sector.  
Findings – This study reveals that it is the tensions between the different components of actors’ 
organising visions which explain their coping responses to institutional complexity and the 
project outcome. The findings also show how the relative influence of different logics and 
elements of organising vision can change as the project progresses from comprehension to 
implementation, and demonstrate the importance of coherence of visions within groups of actors 
as well as between them.  
Originality/value – The analysis demonstrates the role that actors’ organising vision plays in 
bridging between institutional logics and coping responses, thus shaping digital transformation 
projects. The findings indicate the need to account not only for differing institutional logics, but 
                                                 
1 This is the authors accepted manuscript version of a paper forthcoming in Information, Technology & People 
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also for their changing influence as the project unfolds and actors’ attention is directed onto 
different aspects of the organising vision. 
Keywords:  digital transformation projects, IT implementation, institutional complexity, 
institutional logics, organising vision, human resource information systems. 
1. Introduction 
Digital transformation is concerned with the adoption and use of information and digital 
technologies to change different aspects of an organisation, ranging from the creation of new 
business models, to improvements in existing organisational processes and customer experience 
(Berman, 2012). A key aspect of digital transformation projects is the implementation of new 
information technology (IT), often involving large-scale projects that are expected to achieve 
these transformative outcomes. Over the years, encouraged by improvements in IT capabilities, 
many organisations across sectors have invested in such transformative projects. Yet, despite 
decades of research, most new IT projects continue to disappoint, with outcomes well below 
expectations (Doherty et al., 2012). Recent Information Systems (IS) research reports many high-
profile digital transformation projects that have either been abandoned or failed to achieve their 
objectives (e.g. Currie, 2012; Omar et al., 2017). Such reports parallel earlier studies of IT 
implementation projects that highlighted the unfulfilled potential of many such endeavours (e.g. 
Davenport and Stoddard, 1994; Zuboff, 1988). Failure to achieve the expected transformative 
outcomes from new IT implementation projects is often attributed to misalignments between the 
technology and social context (Davidson and Chismar, 2007; Orlikovski, 1992) that emerge as 
the implementation unfolds (Robey and Sahay, 1996). Research often points to the institutional 
complexity of the environment in which these projects take place to explain their unfulfilled 
expectations (Avgerou, 2001). Complexity arises as modern organisational environments 
contains multiple sets of expectations and values (Currie and Guah, 2007). Research also 
highlights that new technologies introduced into organisations may be understood and interpreted 
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differently by different groups of organisational actors, depending on their interests, power, 
expertise and context of use (Davidson, 2002; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994), who inscribe it with 
different sets of meanings, values and assumptions (Robey and Azevedo, 1994), thus developing 
different perceptions of the technology as the implementation unfolds (Abubakre et al., 2017; 
Leidner and Kayworth, 2006). Faced with an unfamiliar technology, actors form their own 
interpretation of different aspects of the technology project, ranging from its business value and 
rational for implementation, to its material features and practices associated with its use 
(Davidson and Pai, 2004), thus collectively envisioning the application of the technology within 
an organisational context – its ‘organising vision’ (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). Thus, to 
understand how IT implementation projects develop in such complex environments, we need to 
account for both the multiplicity of logics that shape actors’ behaviour (the macro level), and 
their emerging envisioning of the technology project (the mezzo level) during its implementation. 
Just because the environment is complex, does not explain why actors pursue certain courses of 
actions during IT implementation. Research has shown that within complex environments, actors 
may often overcome tensions and achieve implementation (Berente and Yoo, 2011), whilst at 
other times their efforts fail and implementation is abandoned (Bunduchi et al., 2015). Moreover, 
just because different actors form different visions of the technology as its implementation 
unfolds, does not explain how these visions change over time (Davidson and Pai, 2004), nor how 
these changes shape actors’ actions vis-à-vis its implementation. Considering how actors’ 
responses to institutional complexity relate to their evolving interpretations of the technology 
project may provide new insights into how IT implementation projects unfold and with what 
outcomes in complex environments. Given the sustained investments organisations make in large 
scale IT transformative projects, and the expectations for widespread improvements in 
organisational performance, understanding how such implementations projects unfold and with 




To investigate this interaction, the paper examines the case of a large-scale digital transformation 
project concerning the implementation and roll-out of a nation-wide HRIS in the public health 
sector of one north European country. The project sought to digitalise and integrate all non-
payroll HR activities across the country’s entire public health system responding to a new 
government’s strategy for digital integration. 
The research question that guides this study is: How do digital transformation projects, involving 
large-scale implementation of new IT, unfold in institutionally complex organisations, where 
actors, developing different visions of the technology, have to cope with multiple demands and 
expectations? To examine actors’ coping strategies and their emerging envisioning of the HRIS 
during its implementation, the paper draws from institutional theory, in particular the institutional 
logics framework. Institutional logics takes account of the social complexity of organisational 
environments (multiple institutional logics), and actors’ actions to cope with such complexity 
(strategic responses) (Thornton et al., 2012). To conceptualise actors’ emerging interpretations 
of the technology project as it unfolds during implementation the paper draws from the concept 
of organising vision (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997).  
The paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews research that examined how IT actors 
cope with institutionally complex contexts and introduces the theoretical concepts that frame this 
research. The paper then describes the research setting and methodology, followed by a 
description of the findings. The paper closes with a discussion of the findings and conclusions 
offering some final comments and suggesting future areas of research. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1.Research on IT implementation in social complex environments  
There is a large body of research that examines the role that the social context plays in explaining 
IS implementation. Such research draws from a range of theoretical lenses, the most common 
being institutional theory, cultural theory and structuration. Institutional (Mignerat and Rivard, 
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2009) and cultural approaches (Leidner and Kayworth, 2006) emphasize the broad set of values, 
norms and expectations in which organizational actors are embedded, and their role in explaining 
IT implementation and use in organizations. While institutional theory considers the role that 
cognitive, regulative and normative structures play in legitimizing behavior and explaining 
individual action (Scott, 1995), cultural theory focuses on the role that cognitive structures play 
in directing behavior (Schein, 1996). Structuration theory also examines how broad social 
structures constrain actors’ behaviors, but contrary to cultural and institutional approaches, it 
emphasizes individual action (Giddens, 1984) as the key factor explaining IT implementation and 
use (Jones and Karsten, 2008).  
Such macro level analyses of technology implementation projects in organisations highlight the 
need to consider the social context in which actors operate. Technologies are social objects whose 
meaning is created by actors operating within specific contexts characterised by particular 
configurations of values, meanings and assumptions (Orlikowsky, 1992). The meaning of 
technology is thus defined by the context (Barley, 1986), and may change over time as different 
actors, involved at different times, may have different interpretations about the problems the 
technology is supposed to solve (Kaghan and Bowker, 2001), and may form different visions 
about what IT represents (Abubakre et al., 2017). The technology thus has “interpretative 
flexibility” in that the problems and solutions associated with the technology present themselves 
differently to different groups of actors at different times during the lifecycle of a technology 
project (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). As the implementation proceeds, the visions different groups of 
actor form about the technology evolve, leading to agreement or conflict depending on whether 
the IT artefact embodies values consistent with the contexts in which these different groups of 
actors operate (Abubakre et al., 2017). This interpretative flexibility quality of technology is 
critical to explain contradictory outcomes of IT change projects (Robey and Azevedo, 1994). 
Lack of congruence between how different groups of actors envision the new technology is 
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widely found to hamper its implementation and use within organisations (Davidson, 2002; 
Olesen, 2014), and its wider diffusion across a particular community (Currie, 2004; Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997; Wang and Swanson, 2007). 
This study examines the complexity of social context in a holistic manner as containing cultural, 
regulative and normative expectations, and considers the interaction between actors’ responses 
to such complexity and their interpretation of the technology. Institutional theory lens allows us 
to capture the role that context plays in shaping individual action, while also taking a holistic 
view of this context (Micelotta et al., 2017). The next section introduces the key institutional 
concepts used to frame this research: institutional logics, strategic responses and organizational 
vision.  
2.2.Conceptual lenses: institutional logics, strategic responses and organizing vision 
Institutional logics refer to the set of assumptions, values, and beliefs that underpin expectations 
and behaviour in organisations (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Researchers have studied how 
institutional logics inform different organizational actors’ perceptions of and responses to the 
same project goals, and how actors shape such logics through their own agency (Thornton et al., 
2012). Examples of logics include family, market and corporation, amongst many others often 
coexisting within the same organisational context. Different logics involve different sources of 
identity, legitimacy and authority, embed different values and expectations, and encourage 
different behaviors and practices (Thornton et al., 2012). While many logics may be represented 
within an organization, their likelihood to guide actors’ behavior varies across actors (Binder, 
2007). Organizational actors are socialized differently, through their professions, work 
experience or culture. Different socializing patterns explain why actors draw from different logics 
to inform their actions (Binder, 2007), for example managers from managerialism logics and 
doctors from medical professionalism logics.  
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There is a large body of research that examines IT implementation within institutionally plural 
organizations where multiple logics coexist. Such studies identify a variety of logics shaping the 
organisational implementation of digital transformation projects. For example, medical 
professionalism, managerial and market logics were found to shape the implementation of the 
national UK’s IT programme that sought to integrate services across the UK national health 
systems (Currie and Guah, 2007), while managerial rationalism, professionalism, and 
organisational persistence characterised the implementation of a new Enterprise Resource 
Planning system in NASA (Berente and Yoo, 2012). The health sector in particular is fertile 
ground in documenting how actors involved in IT implementation projects tackle tensions among 
competing logics (Boonstra et al., 2017; Bunduchi et al., 2015; Currie, 2012; Currie and Guah, 
2007; Jensen et al., 2009). Such studies generally associate different groups of actors with 
different logics: for example, accounting and financial personnel follow managerial rationalism, 
project managers follow project management professionalism, scientific personnel follow the 
logic of scientific professionalism, while some actors draw from multiple logics, e.g. some project 
managers are exposed to both managerial and professional logics (Berente and Yoo, 2012). This 
association is generally implicitly made (e.g. Berente and Yoo, 2012; Bunduchi et al., 2015), and 
assumed to depend on actors’ different socialization patterns (Boonstra et al., 2017): different 
logics guide the behavior of the different actors involved in IT implementation depending on the 
social context to which such actors are exposed: participation in different professional networks, 
for example scientific versus business training, means scientific and accounting personnel are 
exposed to different sets of values and expectations. Actors’ different socialization patterns thus 
explain the multiplicity of logics that informs their behavior during IT implementation (Boonstra 
et al., 2017). The presence of multiple, often competing, logics creates tensions as expectations 
may be misaligned across different group of actors (e.g. Currie and Guah, 2007). Tensions force 
actors to engage in coping strategies during IT implementations. For example, commercial focus 
on generating profit from paying customers versus professional expectations to treat customers 
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as patients creates tensions for commercial opticians seeking to implement a new telehealth 
system, which they addressed through compromising strategies (Bunduchi et al., 2015). 
Research identifies a variety of such coping response strategies including actors loosely coupling 
elements of their practices with different logics (Berente and Yoo, 2012), blending logics to 
develop hybrid logics (Boonstra et al., 2017), translating across logics (Nielsen et al, 2014), 
bracketing specific cues to selectively enact particular logics (Jensen et al., 2009), or alternating 
between strategic responses (Standing et al., 2009). Following Standing et al. (2009) and Berente 
et al. (forthcoming), this paper adopts Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses concept to examine 
how actors cope with multiple logics. Strategic responses refer to the actions that actors may 
adopt to respond to pressures to behave in ways that are consistent with the perceived set of 
institutional norms and expectations that characterise their environment (Oliver, 1991). Oliver 
(1991) identified five strategic responses: acquiescence (conforming), compromise (attempting 
to balance conflicting expectations), avoidance (circumventing the need to conform), defiance 
(rejection or opposition), and manipulation (efforts to change the institutional expectations or 
influence the sources through which these expectations are exerted). Empirical studies have 
shown how such responses can allow individuals or sub-groups (e.g. departments) to demonstrate 
the legitimacy of their actions whilst also preserving their agency, often as a means of advancing 
their specific interests (Oliver, 1991). Oliver suggests that actors engage in different responses 
depending on the levels of authority and uncertainty within the organisation.  
Within IS research, the concept of strategic responses has been used to explain how actors’ efforts 
to cope with tensions among institutional expectations explain the outcome of IT implementation 
projects. Bunduchi et al. (2015) examined how actors operating at the intersection of the public 
– private health sector attempt to reconcile competing expectations through compromise 
responses. Their study found that compromise encourages different actors to develop competing 
visions of the technology project, leading to the failure of the IT implementation project. Standing 
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et al. (2009) documented the coping efforts of actors in a government agency involved in IT 
implementation over time through a succession of strategic responses and demonstrated how the 
cumulative effect of such responses explains the project’s success. Standing et al. (2009) found, 
as Oliver (1991) suggested, that responses vary depending on changes in levels of authority, while 
Berente et al. (forthcoming) links variation in responses and indirectly outcomes of IT 
implementation to the intensity and degree of congruence between logics. Other authors examine 
hybridisation (Boonstra et al., 2017) and translation (Nielsen et al., 2014), loose coupling 
(Berente and Yoo, 2012), and selectivity (Jensen et al., 2009) strategies and document how these 
coping strategies shape the outcome of IT implementation projects, such as the adoption and 
adaptation of standardised systems to local contexts (e.g. Berente and Yoo, 2012; Jensen et al., 
2009), or the failure to adopt a new system (Mangan and Kelly, 2008). 
To understand how actors’ interpretation of the technology shifts during the IT implementation 
project, the study draws from Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) ‘organising vision’ concept 
originally developed to provide an institutional explanation of the diffusion of IT innovations. 
The concept refers to actors’ collective understanding of the purpose of an IT innovation and the 
processes through which it will be embedded and utilised within organisational settings. The 
concept includes three core components: the business problematic – the organisational or 
economic issues that the technology aims to solve, the core technology - the functionality and 
role of the technology, and organisational practices - the changes needed to integrate the 
technology and its impact on work practices. Organising vision develops over time as the 
technology and actors’ understanding of its possibilities co-evolve and diverse interpretations 
within the community coalesce around a shared set of understandings (Swanson and Ramiller, 
1997). The organising vision plays a key role in driving the adoption and diffusion of a new 
technology by explaining how a community of actors interpret a new technology in terms of its 
organisational application, material features and organisational practices, by legitimising the 
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technology within that specific community, and mobilising resources to generate interest and 
support its diffusion (Kaganer et al., 2010; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). Different groups of 
actors develop their own vision of a new technology depending on their own interests, allegiances 
and contexts of use (Currie, 2004; Greenhalgh et al., 2012). 
Within IS research, the organising vision lens has been applied to examine the failure to 
implement telehealth in organisations characterised by different logics (Bunduchi et al., 2015), 
and to successfully diffuse a new IS innovation (Currie, 2004). The concept has also been 
deployed to explain the successful adoption of open source software (Marsan et al., 2012) and 
professional service automation (Wang and Swanson, 2007), as well as to reveal the strategies 
that organisational actors engage in to legitimate a new kind of IS innovation within an 
institutionally complex environment (Kaganer et al., 2010). While failure is explained in terms 
of the inability of different groups of actors to align their interpretations of the technology (e.g. 
Currie, 2004) as they deal with the tensions inherent in their institutionally complex setting (e.g. 
Bunduchi et al., 2015), successful adoption emerges through actors’ efforts to deal with diverse 
interests by developing a consistent vision to legitimate the innovation and mobilize resources 
(Wang and Swanson, 2007). Existing research thus emphasises lack of coherence between the 
organising visions developed by different groups of actors as a key reason why a new technology 
fails to be adopted across a community of actors (Currie, 2004; Greenhalgh et al., 2012; Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997). 








Table 1. Conceptual framework informing our study  
Institutional logics Strategic responses Organising vision 
Multiple set of assumptions, 
values, and beliefs that underpin 
expectations and guide actors’ 
behaviour including family, 
market, corporation, community, 
professional, and state. 
 
Organisational actors are guided 
by different logics depending on 
their different socialisation 
patterns. 
Actors’ coping mechanisms to 
respond to multiple expectations 
associated with multiple logics 
including: acquiescence; avoidance; 
defiance; compromise and 
manipulation. 
Actors engage in different responses 
depending on the nature of the 
institutional environment (e.g. 
congruence and intensity of logics). 
These responses shape how the IT 
implementation unfolds and its 
outcome. 
Reflects a group of actors’ 
interpretations about the technology 
and its applications, and emerges 
gradually as the implementation 
unfolds. This vision is informed by 
the institutional context in which 
actors are embedded, and includes: 
business problematic, core 
technology and organisational 
practices. 
Alignment between the visions 
formed by different groups of actors 
legitimise a new technology and 
facilitates its adoption. 
Institutional theory has been criticised for emphasising the environment as the main conductor 
for organisational behaviour (Binder, 2007). Oliver’s (1991) conceptualising of strategic 
responses and the development of institutional logics theory (Binder, 2007; Thornton et al., 2012) 
have attempted to address this criticism by viewing actors not as passive carriers of institutional 
scripts, but as active interpreters who can adapt and create new practices. Current developments 
in institutional research further seek to explain how actors respond to institutional complexity 
(e.g. Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) or how logics interact with practices to explain action (e.g. 
Smets et al., 2015). These also  address prior criticisms by seeing organisational actors as players 
that make sense of and interpret institutional expectations, and act strategically on these 
interpretations (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001), rather than passive followers of institutional 
constraints. Within this vein, the key contribution of this study is to understand how institutional 
complexity, and actors’ efforts to cope, shape the process and outcome of IT implementation, by 
considering how institutional complexity affects their interpretations of the technology – the 
visions they form about its organisational application. By bridging between responses to 
institutional complexity and interpretations of technology, the study seeks to clarify the 
mechanisms through which institutional complexity shapes IT processes, beyond the current 
focus on considering coping responses. 
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Having identified and discussed the theoretical concepts that underpin this research and the 
contribution that this study seeks to bring to IS research, the next session discusses the research 
methods employed to address the research question. 
3. Methodology 
The research follows an interpretative qualitative case study design. Case studies allow access to 
rich and contextualized data (Yin, 2009) about actors’ behaviours which aligns with this study’s 
aim to examine actors’ responses to their institutional environments, and their shifting 
interpretations during the technology project. The study’s focus on the social context in which 
actors implement the technology also aligns with the interpretative approach (Walsham, 1993). 
3.1. Research setting and selection  
The case involves the introduction of a commercial, off-the-shelf, modular HRIS across the entire 
public health sector in one small north European country. The country’s health system follows 
the Beveridge Model, with almost all healthcare services provided and financed through taxation, 
and a high level of government control (Reid, 2009). The government plays a critical role in 
controlling public spending within health, through its ministry for health where the central 
national health organisation (NHO) coordinating the health system is headquartered (including 
central teams such as e-health, procurement and IS). The health system is split across twenty-two 
regional health organisations (RHOs), which are separate legal entities each with their own HR 
and local IS departments. The programme’s aim was to standardise and upgrade existing HR 
systems to improve the management and exchange of information, in line with the wider strategy 
for digital government services as described in Box 1. The HRIS programme was managed 
centrally by a national HRIS project implementation team based within the NHO. From initial 
conception to realisation, the innovation cycle studied lasted 13 years, as summarised in Table 2, 




Table 2. Historical timeline of the HRIS innovation programme 




January – November 2002 







2007 Outline business case July-December 2007 COMPREHENSION 
2008-2010 HRIS specification 2008 – 2010   
February 2010-
March 2011 
Standard business case & 
procurement 
February-December 2010 ADOPTION 
April - September 
2011 
National preparation, testing 
& training 





1  RHOs 
November 2011 – June 
2012 
April – August 2012 
Implementation phase 
2  RHOs 
Delayed until May – 
November 2013 
September 2012 - 
February 2013 
Implementation phase 
3  RHOs 
December 2013 – May 
2014 
March – August 
2013 
Implementation phase 
4  RHOs 
June – November 2014 
Not planned 
Evaluation of a pilot HRIS 
implementation across 3 
RHOs 
September 2014 - June 
2015, report was supposed 
to be discussed in October 
2015 





5  RHOs 
Planned for March - 
August 2016 
From March 2014 
Use across all RHOs and all 
their users 
RHO 7 - June 2015 
ASSIMILATION* Other RHOs - Not 
available 
* Not in the scope of this study   
The roll-out strategy for the HRIS followed a staggered, multi-stage approach, whereby RHOs 
were engaged in the implementation gradually, based on their stated readiness and motivation. 
To capture the implementation stages, eight RHOs were selected to represent a variety of 
geographies, prior experiences with HRIS systems and implementation stages (see Table 3). 
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Selection of RHOs was informed through consultations with the respondents in the central team 
and analysis of available project documentation. 
Table 3. Selected RHOs 
RHO Size  Region 
Existent 
HRIS 
Stage of implementation 
RHO1 Small Rural Yes 
Implementation + pilot (inside/outside HR) 
+ distribution of logins to users 
RHO2 Large Urban Yes Implementation 
RHO3 Small Urban Yes Implementation + pilot (HR) 
RHO4 Medium Rural No Implementation on hold 
RHO5  Special (one hospital) [very small] Urban Yes Implementation + pilot (HR) 
RHO6 Medium Rural No 
Implementation + pilot (inside/outside HR) 
+ distribution of logins to users 
RHO7  Special (non-clinical) [very small] Urban Yes Finished implementation, early assimilation 
RHO8 Large Rural Yes Implementation + pilot (inside/outside HR) 
     
To inform our sample selection and data analysis we drew on the four-stage model of IS 
innovation which has been widely deployed in institutional IS research (Mignerat and Rivard, 
2009) to examine the introduction of IT in organisations. The model charts comprehension 
(preparing strategies and information), adoption (developing the procedures necessary to enable 
the programme), implementation (introducing the system into the organisation) and assimilation 
(system is fully embedded). The innovation stages are identified according to the activities which 
interviewees described as happening at each stage. As this study focuses on understanding how 
complexity shapes the adoption and implementation of a digital transformation programme, 
rather than its outcomes during use, the analysis examines actors’ coping efforts during the first 






Box 1. Vignette of the HRIS roll-out project  
At the outset of the project, multiple electronic and paper-based HR systems were in use across individual 
RHOs, although a standard national payroll system had already been in place. Diverse business case 
scenarios were comprehensively evaluated prior to choosing how to proceed such as procuring HRIS 
with/without payroll module. Following this process, the new HR system was envisaged as a means of 
integrating all non-payroll related HR activities into a national system, to be interfaced with the existing 
national payroll system. A public procurement exercise led to a successful bidder from an international IT 
vendor offering an off-the-shelf HRIS developed by a large, American system provider. The selected HRIS 
was already used by large organisations around the world, mostly in the private sector, and the IT vendor 
was well known to the NHO, having provided other national-level IT services. A small central national 
implementation team (including between 4-12 employees at different stages during the project) was set up 
in the following year (by reforming the pre-existing NHO workforce information solution project team). Its 
remit included working with the vendor to shape the technical solution, and supporting the RHO-based teams 
during the implementation of the system. Most technical implementation activities were delegated to these 
local teams, with RHOs being expected to dedicate resources to support them. The HRIS included Core HR, 
Employee Relations, Self-service, iRecruitment, Learning Management and HR analytics modules. Rollout 
was scheduled across five staggered phases over a three year period, whereby different groups of RHOs (4-
5 per phase) would gradually initiate their implementation activities. Each phase was planned to last circa 
six months (see Table 2), however the project was extended due to operational delays. The project 
encountered significant resource constraints during its lifecycle which significantly altered its initial scope. 
At the time of data collection only one RHO had fully integrated the new system, while the implementation 
process was still underway in most RHOs. A few RHOs had postponed implementation and were scheduled 
to begin at the beginning following an independent HRIS evaluation. While the study took place during this 
intermediate phase, the programme to achieve full implementation was still underway at the time of writing. 
The selection of the case was informed by the intensity criterion, to consider cases which provide 
access to richer data about the phenomenon (Miles and Huberman, 1998). The healthcare sector 
is well known by its institutional complexity, populated by multiple groups with various 
commercial, political, professional and institutional allegiances, which place different values on 
the use of technologies, and combine interests aligned with professional norms for clinical quality 
with conflicting managerial demands for efficiency (Currie and Guah, 2007; Greenhalgh et al., 
2012). IT implementation projects, especially on a large scale, in the healthcare context are 
notoriously problematic, facing multiple tensions and conflicting response strategies (Currie, 
2012), with new technologies often failing to achieve a coherent organising vision across the 
community (Greenhalgh et al., 2012). The selection of a large-scale implementation project in 
the healthcare sector was thus likely to provide access to a case where the complexity of the 
environment and the variety of visions actors form throughout the IT implementation project was 
likely to be more intense. Moreover, the case was selected at the point when the challenges 
involved in its implementation were evident. The literature links challenges to the presence of 
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institutional complexity and misaligned interpretations, and the researchers expected that the case 
was likely to exhibit both phenomena. The intense manifestation of a phenomena offers the 
researchers the opportunity to access rich data (Miles and Huberman, 1998). 
3.2.Data collection 
Data were collected during the latter implementation stages in 2015 (see Table 2) and involved 
25 semi-structured interviews with 31 actors from the NHO and eight RHOs involved in the 
comprehension, adoption and implementation of HRIS (19 individual and six group interviews); 
and internal and publicly available documentation covering the lifetime of the project. The 
retrospective interviews, supplemented with contemporaneous documentation, asked 
respondents to recall their experience of the project since its beginning in 2007 up to the moment, 
thus covering the entire period of the project. Table 4 in the appendix shows the respondents, 
their location within the national health system, and the stages of the project in which they were 
involved. Respondents were selected to represent all the key actors involved in the project (e.g. 
NHO including central HRIS implementation team, procurement and eHealth teams, and RHOs 
including the local HR departments and the local HRIS implementation teams involving the local 
HR and occasionally IS professionals). Within these categories, selection was based on 
respondents’ knowledge of and involvement with the HRIS project throughout its life time: the 
respondents including project participants recommended by the project’s national lead, snowball 
sampled from contacts suggested during the interviews or who proactively volunteered to 
participate in our research. Interview data and documentary analysis (see Table 5 in appendix) 
were triangulated for cross-verification and to provide a rich picture of users’ experiences and 
the wider context in which the project took place.   
Retrospective methods of data collection are criticized for suffering from respondents’ faulty 
memory and attempts to cast past behavior in a positive light. To address these problems, this 
research followed Miller et al.’s (1997) suggestions for improving the validity of retrospective 
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accounts by: (1) using a semi-structured interview guide to provide interviewees with 
opportunities for free discussion and contextualization of the events recalled; (2) asking 
interviewees to recall things that happened and what they have done during the preparation, 
developing and subsequent roll-out of the HRIS, thus requiring them to recall past events and 
actions, rather than asking for their beliefs at the time; and (3) triangulating between multiple 
informants (31 interviewees), and between multiple sources of data: retrospective interviews and 
contemporaneous project documentation. 
3.3.Data analysis 
Data analysis followed Miles and Huberman’s (1998) approach including iterative movements 
between coding, involving moving gradually between descriptive, interpretative and pattern 
coding, and literature review to facilitate interpretation of data and the emergence of themes. The 
analysis began with open coding of transcripts, what Miles and Huberman call descriptive coding, 
to elicit preliminary categories, using respondents’ own terminology (Gioia et al., 2013). To 
facilitate inter-coder consistency, two researchers independently coded one of the richest 
transcripts and then iteratively reviewed their emergent codes to resolve conceptual or 
interpretive ambiguities.  
Analysis then moved on to interpretative stage, involving searching for thematic patterns and 
relationships, as well as refining the coding framework. This included an iterative process of 
going back and forth from the data to the literature to explore concepts, seek interpretations and 
identify characteristic patterns in actors’ behaviour and the IS innovation process overall. During 
the interpretative stage, the concept of government expectations, later associated with the public-
sector logic, first emerged as a powerful explanation for changes in the process during its 
comprehension and adoption. This finding prompted the researchers to explore institutional 
approaches as a means of enriching the interpretive framework for our observations. Further 
iteration between data and literature revealed other institutional lenses through which to examine 
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the data, in particular institutional logics (to explain the configurations of different institutional 
expectations during different innovation stages); organising vision (to explain the actors’ 
perceptions concerning the objectives, content and processes of the innovation); and strategic 
responses (to explain the changes in the actors’ behaviours vis-à-vis the innovation during its life 
cycle). The data was then revisited and re-coded with reference to these three themes during the 
three innovation stages covered: comprehension, adoption and implementation. The relation 
between the open codes, the interpretative meta-codes (logics, vision, responses) and the final 
patterns emerging from the data are shown in Table 6 and discussed according to the innovation 
stages in the following sections. Table 7 includes the final data structure and exemplary quotes. 
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Table 6. Summary of results 
Stages & strategic 
responses 
Coherence amongst the components of the emerging organising 
vision  
Prevalence of institutional 
logics 
Outcome as envisaged HRIS  
Comprehension: 
Acquiescence 
Coherent vision around a system that allows better management of HR 
processes, delivers high quality health care, supports the government 
agenda, and aligns with best practices in the industry [business 
problematic], supported by standardised and interoperable technologies 
[core technology], and by consistent practices that assume staff as end-
user [organisation practices]. 
Public sector as dominant 
logic, and corporate, 
professional and market as 
subordinate logics guiding 
behaviour. 
HRIS envisaged as standardised and 
interoperable system to cover all the HR 
activities outside payroll and to reflect best 
practices in the sector. 
Adoption: 
Compromise 
Shift in vision which reflects emerging contradictions between the need 
for HR centric, customisable solution with fewer specifications [core 
technology], but a narrower scope of application [business 
problematic], and assume procurement through limited procurement but 
developed through extensive consultative processes [organisation 
practices].  
Public sector and corporate 
logics as dominant logics, 
with professional and market 
as subordinate logics guiding 
behaviour. 
Off the shelf HRIS developed for a different 
context (US private sector) that requires some 
customisation to reflect the specificity of its 








Focus on clarifying the practices involved in the implementation, 
including the de-prioritisation of investment in HRIS, the rationalisation 
of implementation resources, and the parallel use of new and old HR 
systems in RHOs during the implementation of the new system 
[organisation practices]. Re-positioning the HRIS as a generic 
management system (rather than HR) to leverage wider support, and 
changes in the expectations that the new HRIS will not adequately 
support the delivery of HR services to internal clients [business 
problematic]. Such practices come in conflict with the earlier 
expectations around a national system that conforms to industry best 
practices, and delivers a wide range of benefits across quality of care, HR 
processes and government agenda. 
Public sector, corporate, 
market and professional as 
dominant logics guiding 
behaviour. 
An off the shelf HRIS which requires 
significant customisation efforts to work 
within the specific context of the public 
sector healthcare sector, and involving a 
much narrower scope of applications than 








Table 7. Data structure and exemplary quotes 




Government expectations for accurate workforce data: “There was a real desire for consistent and accurate workforce information from 





Government vision for shared HR services: “The overall directives come from the [Government] and they’re looking to have shared 
services within HR, so we all need to be working off the one system and working in the same way.” (R27, R30) [Quote IL-PS2] 
Government vision for digital integration: “The key driver for a system was to have a system that would allow HR and payroll systems to 
speak to each other.” (R10) [Quote IL-PS3] 
Government expectations to reduce spending across public sector: “Now the [NHO] has been cut back, cut back, cut back, as all public 
sector have, and there isn’t this spare capacity. Well I don’t think there ever was but there isn’t even the opportunity to find any spare 
capacity or even go and ask for additional funding because the answer is quite firmly no, there is no extra money. So again, your hands 
are tied by the kind of financial pressures of doing a big project within a public sector.” (R1) [Quote IL-PS4] 
Expectations to comply with the public sector regulations on equality and diversity: “There are so many guidelines and regulations that 
the [NHO] puts in place and probably public sector does this around equality, around the ability of managers to do recruitment and so 
on and so forth.” (R1) [Quote IL-PS5] 
The concern for efficient management “At the time, the system was brought in to improve quality and effectiveness within the HR 
community. So ultimately that’s what everybody bought into is having a consistent high quality system that allowed them to have just in 
time information” (R10) [Quote IL-CL1] 
Corporate 
logic The concern for efficient management of a highly diverse organisation: “I would say that there was a degree of difficulty because you've 
got [large number of RHOs] with different systems currently in use. So to merge all the systems to a system that suits all the [RHOs] and 
all the processes and systems then I think the range now of the specification became quite wide.” (R15) [Quote IL-CL2] 
Expectations to align with industry best practices: “I suppose if you look across industry, most large scale organisations would have an 




Expectations to differentiate from their closest competitor: “So we then worked on a specification for the national HR system and what we 
did was we stole with pride the [other EU country] specification for their scheme and we worked on that and we [localized] that.” (R1) 
[Quote IL-ML2] 
logic 
RHOs expectations for improving the provision of HR services to their employees “All employees care about is their annual leave.  They 
don’t care about anything else…  So, if we can’t get that – you know, if we can’t give that to them, then….There’s no point in it.” (R27-
R30) [Quote IL-ML3] 
Expectations that health workers data would serve to monitor statutory registration of medical professions: “So if you're a doctor, you must 
be registered with the [Professional Medical Association]. If you're a nurse, you must be registered with the [Professional Nursing 
Association] and so it goes on.” (R1) [Quote IL-PL1] 
Profession 
logic 
The norms for consensus based decision making: “That’s the way we work in the [NHO], it’s no different to this project. So at the end of 
the day we’re very consultative…You can't buy a product and then insist that [all RHOs] will bring it in without any buy in and 
consultation. So no matter what you do, if you're bringing in a national project you need to get all your actors to agree to it. So that’s not 
a criticism you would expect there to be dialogue and consultation and engagement and people tied into it.” (R10) [Quote IL-PL2] 
Expectations to prioritize clinical eHealth systems: “More investment, understandably, is placed on the clinical systems….” (R14) [Quote 
IL-PL3] 
The new HRIS will serve to solve the problem of statutory reporting: “It should enable us to get some really good reports about the 





The new HRIS will solve the problem associated with the lack of interoperability between the different HR systems operating within 
RHOs: “What I would say is, and this has been one of the fundamental things from the start, is that the system itself was required to 
integrate with a number of other national feeds”. (R2) [Quote OV-BP2] 
The new HRIS will increase the efficiency of HR processes through standardising processes across individual sites: “The recruitment 
process is quite complex but it’s also we also have challenges within recruiting clinicians and folk all around [the country], so it was really 
bringing in a standardised way of doing that, but it was efficient and efficient and could work quickly for both people applying for jobs 
but also people who were managing the process of recruitment.” (R4) [Quote OV-BP3] 
The new HRIS will improve team management and recruitment: “Basically for the manager to have full access to their team’s terms, 
conditions, absence, training – things like that.  So that’s the kind of main benefits.” (R18) [Quote OV-BP4] 
The new HRIS would address the recruitment capacity problem and enable better workforce planning: “Recruitment in the [NHO] is 
absolutely top priority at the moment. We really struggle to get people in, we’ve got real recruitment shortages, staff shortages and things 
like that.” (R2) [Quote OV-BP5] 
The scope of the new HRIS to address HR management problems is narrower: “The scope was too wide, even when we cut it down, it was 
going to be expensive. And we cut it, it was quite easy through discussion with our HR directors to say ‘right, we’ll take that out, we’ll 
take that out, we’ll take that out and this is what we’ll then go for’.” (R1) [Quote OV-BP6] 
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The new HRIS is a management wide system that can support better quality of care: “We keep promoting the fact that [new system] is not 
an HR system; that it’s actually a management system.” (R14) [Quote OV-BP7] 
The new HRIS is unable to support their ability to deliver HR services to their internal clients: “And when the people at the bottom are 
saying, ‘Oh, it doesn’t work’, that goes up the chain; they then come to meetings and go, ‘Well, I’ve been told it doesn’t work.’ And you’re 
going, ‘But why?’ and they’re going, ‘Well, I’ve been told it doesn’t work.’ But the damage is done, because they sit in a meeting saying, 
‘It doesn’t do this.’ And even if you say, ‘Er, stop a minute. It does actually do that’, all the people round the table have heard is ‘it doesn’t 
do that’.” (R2) [Quote OV-BP8] 
The new system will consist of one single system across all RHOs: “HR experts got together and thought instead of having individual 
systems that didn't really talk to each other, we should have one national system.” (R5) [Quote OV-CT1] 
Core 
technology 
The new system will allow no customisation to individual RHOs requirements: “We also didn’t want any ability for [RHOs] to be able to 
tweak their bit of the system to what they wanted and then find of course it doesn’t actually match up with the data in all of the other 
[RHOs] because unfortunately, across an organization like this, there are [many] variations of the truth if you like. So [RHOs] will 
implement things in their own way, they have slightly different procedures, they interpret the regulations slightly differently, they apply 
them slightly differently.” (R2) [Quote OV-CT2] 
The new system will rely on technology solution that was successfully implemented in other complex and large organizational setting: “If 
you look at the “system supplier” system, the “system supplier” product has been very successful…You know, there’s some large 
organizations with-, and there’s some worldwide organizations who just have the “system supplier” product and it works.” (R10) [Quote 
OV-CT3] 
The system will interface with the national professional medical association systems: “To have an interface from the [Professional Medical 
Association] to update the doctors’ registrations.” (R1) [Quote OV-CT4] 
The new system will have few system specifications and be based on the off-the-shelf core technology specification: “We went through 
this process and we came to the point where the options narrowed down and it came down to buying an off-the-shelf HR system and bolting 
it onto payroll.” (R1) [Quote OV-CT5] 
The new system requires some limited customisation to comply with legislation requirements: “I kept saying to “the vendor” and to 
“system supplier”, you know, ‘we’re special but we’re not that special and what we are asking you for here in our view is actually illegal 
- it’s legislative for us and therefore it must be legislative for everybody else’ and when you buy the “system supplier” system, it’s set up 
as a global worldwide system and you get it set up for the legislation in your part of the world…, but still they said ‘no that’s not how it’s 
built’ and I had difficulty with that on a personal level, because I thought well for goodness’ sake how on earth.” (R1) [Quote OV-CT6] 
The new system will involve some customisation to address the needs of the NHO / individual RHOs: “They had the specification and 
then obviously the system they bought was just an off the shelf system that they just put the basic package and then obviously they needed 




The system would be HR centric: “The other issue was that we actually have a payroll system that works and is national and if you were 
implementing a new system we’d actually get caught up in implementing the payroll part of it to ensure that people were paid and the HR 
part of it, which is the bit we really wanted, would be second-rate, and that’s what happened in [a neighbouring country]…, [but] they 
had a number of different payroll systems, which we didn't have, and so that led to us getting to the point of saying ‘well look, let’s get an 
HR system and link to payroll.” (R1) [Quote OV-CT8] 




Changes in the procurement practices from open to restricted procurement: “So at that point, we started looking at the invitation to tender, 
then all tendering process and you can either do an open procurement or a restricted procurement and we decided that because our spec 
was quite tight, we would go for a restricted procurement, which should have cut down on the time that it took to go through the 
procurement process.” (R1) [Quote OV-OP2] 
Extensive consultation process involved in eliciting system requirements across different categories of actors: “In writing the requirements 
we had gone out to the whole of the [NHO] HR services across [the country] and invited people in in groups, expert groups within various 
elements – recruitment, employee relations, you know, attendance and training – and we put these people in a group. So we had groups 
of what we call experts if you like. They formed what we called workflow groups. Now they were the experts that informed the requirement 
specifications for their areas so we knew exactly what it was that was needed. They also, and they still run today albeit in slightly different 
forms, they were also there to be the kind of expert users as we went through the conference room pilots, through into testing and so on 
and so forth. So if there’s anything as a central team as we had here and we weren’t sure what was needed, we would go and ask the 
expert groups to give us advice and guidance on this. And those groups, as I say, still run today.” (R2) [Quote OV-OP3] 
Implementation is coordinated centrally by the small central IT team, and locally by the HR managers: “They also said ‘well, rather than 
the national team be responsible for the implementation locally in the [RHOs] in the same way, the [RHOs] will take that responsibility’ 
and the [RHOs] signed up and they said ‘yeah, we’ll take that, we’ll do that, we’ll set up the teams locally’ and so on and so forth.” (R2) 
[Quote OV-OP4]    
Local implementation team are starved of resources “we didn't have someone specific to work on these projects, so [my colleague] and I 
did that along with our day jobs… So it was very time consuming, so we’re trying to juggle our day job with implementing [HRIS], so it 
hasn't been easy.” (R15 & R16) [Quote OV-OP5]  
The differences in RHOs practices are reflected in complexity surrounding the implementation of HRIS: “Some [RHOs] have got live 
data in but some of the data, sets are very small so for our data, you know, our data’s the equivalent of three or four other RHOs all at 
one time, so it’s got to be spot on for us.” (R10) [Quote OV-OP6] 
Delays in data migration: “To be fair, we underestimated [data migration duration] because we didn’t realise how long it was going to 
take.” (R2) [Quote OV-OP7]   
De-prioritization of investment in non-clinical systems: “Bearing in mind that [the new HRIS] isn’t progressing very quickly across 
[NHO], perhaps it hadn’t been prioritized against clinical systems that are needed now.” (R14) [Quote OV-OP8] 
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RHOs continue to use their pre-existing HR systems in parallel with pursing the implementation of the new HRIS: “And then we’ll be 
able to test that we can keep the system up to date, and then the plan would be, that would allow us, assuming that the system is deemed 
to be completely fit for purpose, to start to roll it out to managers. And then, stop our [pre-existing HRIS] contract at a point in time where 
we’ve got the system rolled out.” (R26) [Quote OV-OP8] 
Compliance with the HRIS: “Rather than say it’s mandatory, all [RHOs] committed to sign up to it as a consortium approach, because 
obviously the view was we would want a common system across [NHO]”. (R10) [Quote R-Acq1] 
Acquiescence 
Responses 
Accelerating compliance “Originally we were in phase three but then we moved to phase two….I think we felt we were ready because 
things appeared to be going well and because we’re a small RHO and they were keen for a small RHO, you know, to go live.  So we were 
happy to do it at the time.” (R15 & R16) [Quote R-Acq2] 
Seeking solutions to balance the expectations of multiple actors: “Now if there’s something that doesn’t necessarily cost money but would 
impact other [RHOs], I’ve got to ask [them]…. I chair the deputy directors of HR for [NHO]. So I check with my colleagues, my deputy 
directors, any impacts it would have on their [RHOs]. I guess an example of that was there was an alert in the system for fixed term 
contracts. The alerts were set at 30 days – 90 days and then 30 days – and a couple of the [RHOs] had come to me saying that they would 
prefer it to sit at 120, then 30 days. So that had an impact. So I had to check with my colleagues a preference and I just went with the 
majority, which was now 120 and then 30 day alerts. So it’s things like that, that I make sure that other [RHOs] understand the implications 
of changing these alerts.” (R9) [Quote R-C1] 
Compromise 
 Engaging in different degrees of use to balance multiple expectations “The system has come in and what [RHOs] are doing, and this is 
very much my view so please treat this as my view, they're all doing something different and they're picking -, some RHOs are using bits 
of it, some RHOs are not using very much of it at all aside from to try and keep it up to date a bit but they're not actually using it.” (R1) 
[Quote R-C2] 
Delaying progressing the implementation: “There are three [RHOs] as I said who haven’t yet migrated now they’ve – because payroll, 
they’re basically sticking with the payroll interface and because the payroll interface isn’t going to be delivered till October they’ve now 
delayed until kind of May/June next year.” (R2) [Quote R-Av] 
Avoidance 
Dropping out of the phased implementation: “It was going to be four [RHOs] but [one RHO] dropped out because they felt that their own 
system, they had their own system at the time, gave them what they needed. They felt the risk of moving to the new system, given the 
difficulties and the extra time they’d taken, wasn’t going to immediately take over from that system, there were going to be some gaps 
between them. So they asked to move to a later phase so we kind of rolled out with three [RHOs].” (R2) [Quote R-D] 
Defiance  
Seeking another pilot testing and an independent evaluation to re-evaluate the actors’ expectations: “And back last summer, there was a 
view that it just felt we were treading water with this whole process. We weren’t getting to the stage where it was getting rolled out across 
the [NHO] and used effectively. And we were saying, ‘yeah, well, we’re having similar problems.’ There were just so many bits and pieces 
that needed to be looked at, and somebody needed to focus on working through these things. So what [central project team] agreed last 
summer was that it would be useful if we could get three [RHOs] who would look at the system and try and get it working end-to-end 






The analysis of responses, at the NHO and RHO levels, revealed four dominant institutional 
logics shaping the comprehension, adoption, and implementation of the HRIS innovation across 
the public-sector organisations. A public-sector logic characterised the NHO as a government 
institution with a remit to deliver healthcare services to the nation’s citizens whilst also 
responsibly managing public finances; a corporate logic emphasised the improved efficiency and 
effectiveness of the NHO through better use of information; a market logic prioritising the 
competitive status of the NHO relative to international and private-sector benchmarking points, 
and a professional logic emphasised the importance of delivering high quality care to patients. 
While each of these logics was evident across the three innovation stages included in the study, 
they prioritised different expectations, norms and sources of legitimacy, and varied in the extent 
to which they informed the NHO and RHO actors’ behaviours during the different phases of the 
programme. Moreover, transitions between stages necessitated a reorientation of each prevailing 
logic, to preserve its currency. During the comprehension stage where the key task involved 
clarifying the rationale for adoption, all logics focused both NHO and all RHO actors’ attention 
on the organisational problem that the innovation was expected to solve, and this homogeneity 
helped to generate buy-in to the overarching vision, across the constituents of this large and 
diverse national organisation - for a standardised and interoperable system that integrates all HR 
activities across the organisation and reflects best practices in the sector (see also Table 6). At 
this stage, less attention was paid to the details of the technology that would address this 
organisational problem and the implementation processes required to realise the vision. As the 
innovation progressed to adoption and the key task shifted towards clarifying the system 
specifications, the logics needed to accommodate NHO and RHO actors’ expectations about the 
core technologies and their impacts on organisational practices, which led to changes actors’ 
emerging organising vision of the HRIS. Actors now envisaged some form of lightly customised 
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off-the-shelf system that could reflect the specificity of their particular context of use. At the 
implementation stage, as the key task shifted towards getting RHOs to implement and use the 
system in their operations, the logics rationalised the reorganisation of work practices needed to 
transform the vision into reality. The vision now changes significantly to involve a highly 
customised system, with a much narrower scope of application that originally expected.  
At both central and regional level, actors’ ability to respond to prevalent institutional expectations 
and reorient their behaviours in accordance with changing priorities between stages was 
influenced by the degree of dissonance between the components of their organising vision for the 
technology. This process is described in the following sections which discuss the NHO and RHO 
actors’ perceptions and responses during the innovation stages (see Table 7 with exemplary 
quotes). 
4.1. Comprehension 
Comprehension was marked by actors’ efforts to clarify the rational for the introduction of the 
new HRIS. The public-sector logic dominated comprehension and was prevalent as the project 
unfolded. The HRIS project was triggered by the political agenda of a newly formed government 
and was loosely built around three objectives: to achieve accurate and timely workforce data, to 
rationalise HR services, and to progress IT systems interoperability across the public sector [see 
Quotes IL-PS1-3 in Table 7]. These government expectations focused NHO and RHO actors’ 
attention on the specific organisational problems that the new HRIS was supposed to solve: 
enabling RHOs to generate standardized statutory workforce reports [Quote OV-BP1], enabling 
the NHO to coordinate all HR activities centrally and to improve HR management by joining 
(almost) all HR services into a single system, and to create interoperability between multiple HR 
systems and practices across individual RHOs [business problematic] [Quote OV-BP2]. This 
vision for an accurate, national and integrated HRIS solution to centrally manage all HR services 
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was complemented by the vision for a single, standardised system to replace the multiple local 
HR solutions developed across the RHOs [core technology] [Quote OV-CT1]. 
Other logics supplemented the public-sector logic in focusing actors’ attention on aspects of the 
business problematic for the new HRIS, which remained closely aligned with the government’s 
broad agenda for digital integration.  
The corporate logic focused NHO attention on national-level HR processes and systems that 
facilitate efficient information and resource management across RHOs [Quote IL-CL1], mostly 
through standardising corporate processes. NHO envisaged the HRIS project to improve the 
efficiency of central HR departments by eliminating the need to reconcile workforce data from 
diverse RHO HR systems [business problematic] [Quote OV-BP3]. This business problematic 
was associated with expectations of a single technical solution that should not be customised by 
individual RHOs [core technology] [Quote OV-CT2] and used by all employees [organisational 
practices] [Quote OV-OP1]. 
The market logic drew the NHO central implementation team’s attention to ‘best practices’ 
adopted elsewhere, which it sought to emulate. These were based on (a) an HRIS project in an 
adjacent country, which was commonly used by the NHO as a benchmark of its service quality 
and performance; on (b) HRIS initiatives in other large organisations (e.g. private), and (c) on 
other IS implementation projects within the NHO that involved standardised nationwide clinical 
(e.g. electronic prescribing) and administrative (e.g. finance) systems. Expectations of alignment 
with perceived ‘best practices’ [Quote IL-ML1] explained the NHO’s preference for choosing a 
large scale, international HRIS solution that had been proven elsewhere [core technology] 
[Quote OV-CT3]. 
The professional logic was evident in the national medical association’s requirements for 
accurate data to monitor the qualifications and registration of NHO doctors, and in the NHO’s 
need for data to ensure a suitably skilled and capable medical workforce [Quote IL-PL1]. These 
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professional expectations shaped the NHO and RHO actors’ interpretation of the HRIS as being 
interoperable with the medical association’s own systems [core technology] [Quote OV-CT4] 
and aimed at improving the management of staff absences/shortages, and the recruitment and 
retention of medical staff [business problematic] [Quote OV-BP4-5].  
To summarise, during the comprehension phase, multiple logics converged to focus the NHO and 
RHO actors’ attention on agreeing the rationale for the HRIS project, thus emphasising the need 
for actors to clarify the organisational problem – or business problematic - that the new system, 
triggered by the government’s political agenda, was supposed to address. These logics generated 
a coherent set of expectations around a standardised, interoperable and proven technical solution 
[core technology] that would enable NHO and RHOs to channel the government’s vision, 
improve HR management across vastly diverse organisational units [business problematic & 
organisational practices], enhance the performance of the NHO by aligning with industry best 
practices [core technology], and respond to professional demands for delivering high quality 
health care [core technology & business problematic]. The apparent cohesion between these 
different components of the organising vision explains the NHO and RHO actors’ willingness to 
conform to institutional expectations (acquiescence response) and this acquiescence behaviour 
explains their strong shared commitment to the HRIS project during comprehension [Quote R-
Acq1]. 
4.2.Adoption 
As the project reached adoption and the NHO sought to clarify the system specification and begin 
the procurement process, the context changed significantly, with the unfolding of the financial 
crisis of the 2007-2008 triggering broad cost cutting measures across the public sector. The 
public-sector logic channelled these new government demands for frugality in all planned 
investments [Quote IL-PS4]. Due to these changed circumstances the NHO was forced to narrow 
its vision of what HR management problems the new HRIS could address [business 
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problematic] [Quote OV-BP6]. This required the specifications to be refocused midway through 
the procurement process, to prioritise core system functionalities [core technology] [Quote OV-
CT5]. Requirements for cost cutting also changed the procurement process, with the budget, 
unusually, being specified in the tender documentation and a pre-qualification questionnaire 
being introduced prior to tendering to save costs during bid evaluation [organisational practice] 
[Quote OV-OP2]. The public-sector logic also demanded compliance with the specific equality 
and diversity regulations, which required strict control over access to recruitment data [Quote IL-
PS5]. These expectations altered the NHO’s original expectations for a standard solution, 
highlighting the need for some limited customisation of any off the shelf solution, for example in 
terms of introducing options to hide candidates’ sex and age data to the recruiting manager, to 
ensure regulatory compliance [core technology]. [Quote OV-CT6] 
These changes in the envisaged scope of the HRIS, reflecting the new frugal public-sector logic, 
gradually shifted out of synch with the corporate and professional logics whose influence became 
more apparent during adoption.  
At the comprehension stage the corporate logic had also prioritised the achievement of 
efficiencies through standardising HR management practices, generating expectations for a fixed 
solution. However, during adoption the RHOs and NHO efforts to agree on system specification 
led to recognition that HR services and needs vary significantly across RHOs depending on the 
contexts in which their employees operate [Quote IL-CL2]; for example geographically dispersed 
rural RHOs compared with urban RHOs. As such, it become apparent that full standardisation 
runs the risk of reducing the quality of the HR services RHOs offer to their employees. The 
corporate logic thus shifted at this stage from creating expectations for a standard system to 
envisioning a solution involving some degree of customisation to local RHO requirements [core 
technology] [Quote OV-CT7], in contrast with the public-sector logic which focused 
expectations on a narrow, no-frills, core functionalities solution.  
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During adoption, the professional logic was manifested in the efforts of the NHO central 
implementation team to achieve consensus amongst diverse NHO actors and ensure broad buy-
in to the new HRIS [Quote IL-PS2]. This led to extensive engagement and consultation across 
the whole spectrum of audiences during adoption, to elicit requirements [organisational 
practices] and build system specifications [core technology] [Quote OV-OP3]. This again 
conflicted with the public-sector institutional logic, which favoured an off-the-shelf technical 
solution with minimal potential for local customisation.  
The market logic was evident in expectations within the NHO about benchmarking the IS 
initiative against comparable initiatives elsewhere. During comprehension this logic had focused 
the NHO team' attention on seeking alignment with perceived best practices, while during 
adoption the emphasis shifted, with the NHO keen to differentiate this HRIS project with the 
neighbouring country’s payroll-led HRIS implementation project [Quote IL-ML2]. This shift 
helps to explain the NHO’s preference for a HR-led system, which it was felt would better suit 
their requirements and context [core technology] [Quote OV-CT8]. 
To summarise, as the project moved from comprehension (clarifying the rationale for the project), 
to adoption (clarifying system specification and procurement of a suitable system), the NHO and 
RHOs actors’ efforts shifted from envisaging the business problematic the HRIS would solve 
to clarifying the core technology this would require, to identifying the organisational practices 
that would be required to achieve this solution. Despite tensions arising from a shift in the vision 
developed for the core technology associated with the HRIS (broad and standardised versus 
narrow and customisable), there was little effort to revisit and refine the business problematic, 
beyond acknowledging the reduced scope of the project. The business problematic was now 
misaligned both with the new expectations for customisable technology and the practices 
involving extensive (and time consuming) consultation processes that emerged during adoption. 
This dissonance between and within the components of the organising vision explained the 
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change in NHO and RHOs’ response from acquiescence to compromise [Quote R-C1]. 
Compromise explains the slowing down of the project at this stage, as HR professionals tried to 
convince the NHO to delay the implementation process to give them time to reconcile these 
competing expectations, while the central NHO team sought agreement among RHOs, other 
NHO actors (government representatives) and the IT vendor. 
4.3.Implementation 
Implementation was marked by a shift in the focus of actors’ efforts towards the introduction of 
the system within RHOs, and its use to support their HR practices. Implementation was to be 
coordinated centrally by the central NHO-based implementation team, while all local 
implementation activities, such as data migration, testing, training and change management, were 
to be undertaken by individual RHOs.  
The public-sector logic of cost efficiency continued as a dominant influence shaping the 
organisational practices involved in the implementation process. Requirements for frugality 
across the public-sector operations meant that both the NHO and the 22 RHOs were provided 
with little or no additional staffing resources to support the new system implementation. Local 
implementation teams thus comprised mainly existing HR full time staff, who were expected to 
manage the additional work in addition to their normal full-time responsibilities [organisational 
practices] [Quote OV-OP4-5]. 
During implementation, the corporate logic around effective management shifted in emphasis 
from specifying the core technology to clarifying the organisational practices associated with its 
introduction and use in RHOs, particularly those around data migration required by the 
implementation of the new system. With significant differences in organisational size and 
historical data management practices hampering the RHOs’ ability to follow the prescribed data 
migration approach, which assumed standardised data [Quote OV-OP6], it quickly became 
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evident that the 6-month plan for migrating to the new system was unrealistic [organisational 
practices] [Quote OV-OP7]. 
Juxtaposed with the public-sector cost cutting pressures, professional logics prioritizing clinical 
over administrative systems shaped the central and local HRIS implementation teams’ 
interpretations of the NHO decision to cut funding for HRIS project delivery [Quote IL-PL3]. 
With no new staff hired to support the delivery of the HRIS project, implementation fell to 
existing full-time staff, significantly slowing down the process [organisational process] [Quote 
OV-OP8]. Aware of the low priority given to HR systems, HR professionals sought to re-frame 
the HRIS as a ‘strategic management system’ whose scope extends beyond HR activities to 
improving the quality and effectiveness of care, thus aligning with professional and corporate 
logics [business problematic] [Quote OV-BP7]. 
The market logic proved the most influential at this stage in shaping how the NHO and RHOs 
evaluated the use of HRIS, based on expectations about its potential to deliver competitive, high 
quality services to their customers (e.g. employees and candidates) [Quote IL-ML3], rather than 
its alignment with government vision (cf. public-sector logic) or compliance with the NHO 
mandate (corporate logic). The RHOs’ vision for a customisable system that delivers a high-
quality HR service to their employees conflicted with the post-austerity ‘no frills’ core service 
prioritised by the NHO, resulting in no dedicated resources being provided and data migration 
delays. These tensions became more evident as implementation proceeded in early RHO adopter 
sites, explaining RHOs’ concerns that the new system might be unable to meet their HR needs, 
or be inferior to their existing HRIS [business problematic] [Quote OV-BP8]. These tensions 
and uncertainties led many RHOs to run both systems in parallel [organisational practices] 
during the project [Quote OV-OP8]. 
As the project moved from adoption (with a focus on clarifying specifications) to implementation 
(with a focus on data migration and actual use), RHOs and NHO actors’ attention shifted to 
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clarifying the organisational practices associated with HRIS. Tensions between the organising 
vision components that had emerged during adoption now became entrenched as changes in 
project specifications resulted in mismatching expectations of the RHOs and NHO regarding the 
business problematic and core technology. The project narrative at this stage reflected a de-
prioritisation of the innovation, disinvestment and rationalisation of the implementation resources 
both at NHO level, and within individual RHOs [organisational practices]. These austere 
practices were in dissonance with the initial vision NHO and RHOs had for a broad, nation-wide, 
modular and digitally integrated HR system with strong government commitment, aligned with 
industry best practices, and delivering a wide range of benefits to all. Consequently, the RHOs’ 
vision of the business problematic addressed by the new HRIS - improved ability to deliver HR 
related tasks, narrowed down dramatically [business problematic], with activities now focused 
on de-risking the transition by concurrently running the new and old systems.  
To respond to this dissonance, RHOs enacted a range of strategic responses, which varied 
according to their stage of involvement (earlier versus later adopter) and on their context (size 
and the presence of a pre-existing electronic HR system). In the early stages of implementation, 
most RHOs, especially those without pre-existing HRIS, decided to accelerate their acquiescence 
by asking to move faster with the project [Quote R-Acq2]. As the implementation proceeded, 
organising practices clarified and begun to reveal the dissonance with the core technologies and 
business problematic, leading to an increase in the variety of responses exhibited by the RHOs. 
Most of the later stage RHO adopters followed a compromise response, engaging in different 
approaches to implement the system in an effort to balance various institutional demands [R-C2]. 
Examples include requesting multiple adaptations to better align the system with their current HR 
practices, or limiting their exposure to the system by introducing it only within their HR 
departments, in small pilots outside of HR; or by making its utilization voluntary. A number of 
RHOs insisted on implementing only modules that they were happy with, whilst continuing to 
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rely on their existing HRIS for other functions, arguing that some of the new HRIS modules are 
not fit for purpose.  In addition to these compromise responses, other RHOs, including those 
which had previously conformed to the NHO’s expectations and engaged with the system, now 
openly engaged in defiance by withdrawing from implementation, in some cases even after 
substantial investments had been made in data migration [Quote R-D]. The most common 
response, however, was avoidance, as most RHOs decided not to complete their scheduled 
implementation activities until the system had been proven in other RHOs [Quote R-Av]. 
Mounting government demands to continue with implementation meant that compromise 
responses were largely unsuccessful in reconciling dissonant perceptions of the organising vision, 
while defiance and avoidance strategies were difficult to maintain. Without an obvious means of 
resolution in sight, some RHOs adopted a manipulation response to try to resolve these dissonant 
perceptions, including efforts to change the expectations surrounding the deployment of the HRIS 
by requesting that the central implementation team undertake a pilot to identify which parts of 
the system were fit-for-purpose [core technology] and then generate a list of best practices for 
system implementation and use [organisational practices], reflecting the new, narrower vision 
for the system [business problematic]. This request was accommodated by the central team 
[Quote R-M], and the pilot finished mid-way through this study’s data collection. Most 
respondents expected the implementation to continue regardless of the outcome of the pilot, due 
to the large financial investment already made and the government’s strong commitment to the 
system. While waiting for the results of the pilot, all but one RHOs where system implementation 
was underway delayed the project’s progression. 
5. Discussion 
Research examining the implementation of transformative IT projects in institutionally complex 
settings highlights both the multiplicity of logics that characterise such environments (Berente 
and Yoo, 2012; Currie and Guah, 2007), and the shifting envisioning of the technology by 
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organisational actors as the project unfolds (Abubakre et al., 2017; Robey and Azevedo, 1994). 
To bridge these levels, our interpretative framework draws on the concepts of institutional logics, 
organising vision, and strategic responses to examine how actors’ responses to institutional 
complexity and their emerging interpretations of technology interact to shape the outcome of an 
IT implementation project. The findings are summarised in Figure 1 below (see also Table 6) and 
discussed in the rest of the section. 
Figure 1. Visual representation of the findings 
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A growing literature examining IT implementation projects in institutionally complex settings 
suggests that tensions between multiple logics shape the outcome of such projects. An important 
assumption here is that such tensions arise as different socialised actors operating within the same 
environment draw from different logics to guide their behaviour (e.g. Boonstra et al., 2017), 
forcing them to engage in coping behaviour to address these tensions (e.g. Currie and Guah, 
2007). This coping behaviour – actors’ responses to institutional complexity – explains the 
outcome of IT implementation projects, for example the successful adaptation of standardised 
technology when coping resolves tensions between multiple logics (e.g. Berente and Yoo, 2012), 
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or implementation failure when coping fails to reconcile conflicting logics (Mangan and Kelly, 
2009). 
 In contrast, this case study reveals that although the multiple institutional landscape remains 
similar throughout the stages involved in the digital transformation project, actors change how 
they respond to this contextual complexity by emphasising different sets of logics at different 
times. This emphasis varies depending on the key task actors focus on at different stages during 
the project life cycle: envisioning the technology application during comprehension, when the 
rationale for adoption has to be agreed upon; clarifying the core technology as embodied in the 
system specifications that are negotiated as the technology is being procured during adoption; 
and considering the organisational practices involved during implementation as the technology 
is introduced into use. Moreover, changes in the nature of the task actors focus on at different 
stages during the innovation project means that the same institutional logics may direct actors’ 
attention onto different aspects of the organising vision at different times. For example, in the 
case studied here, the emphasis of market logic during comprehension was alignment with best 
practice but shifted to differentiation (e.g. from competitors or other HRIS projects) during 
adoption. The relative influence of specific expectations associated with different institutional 
logics in guiding actors’ behaviour varied across the project not, as expected, because of the 
involvement of multiple actors socialised differently (Boonstra et al., 2017), but because of the 
shift in the task actors focused on during different stages. Most institutional expectations were in 
fact present throughout the stages, but only became salient to the actors involved once the focus 
of the project moved through the stages from comprehension to delivery, highlighting 
misalignments that had hitherto been underplayed or worked around. Moreover, in this case, the 
key tensions were not among the logics themselves, as reported in previous studies (Berente and 
Yoo, 2012; Bunduchi et al., 2015; Currie and Guah, 2007), but among the interpretations actors 
develop concerning different components of the technology’s organising vision: its business 
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problematic, core technology and organisational practices. For example, shared expectations 
about efficiency (dominated by corporate logic) led to a vision for a standardised central system 
during comprehension, whereas the priority shifted towards customisation during adoption, as 
the challenges of embedding the system within the organisation became apparent.  
This project considered not only the institutional complexity that actors must cope with, but also 
their efforts to interpret, make sense of and envision different aspects of a new, unfamiliar 
technology as its implementation unfold. The findings suggest that in institutionally complex 
settings, IT implementation project outcomes result from the interaction between the visions the 
actors form about the technology and their coping behaviour to resolve this complexity. Thus, it 
is not institutional complexity alone that shapes how actors behave and implement technology 
and with what outcomes, as described in existing research (e.g. Berente et al., forthcoming). 
Rather, actors’ coping behaviour emerges as they envisage different aspects of the technology in 
response to both institutional complexity and the nature of task to which the focus of their 
attention is directed at different project stages. In this study, coping strategies arose due to 
dissonance between the competing visions actors had formed about different aspects of the 
technology involved in the digital transformation project – its organisational application, core 
technology and work practices - rather than due to tensions between logics themselves.  
Cultural studies of IT implementation find that the level of alignment or conflict in vision between 
different groups of actors is critical for explaining the use of IT following implementation 
(Abubakre et al., 2017). This has been attributed to misalignment between the values embedded 
in the IT and those associated with different actors’ contexts (Leidner and Kayworth, 2007). In 
the digital transformation project studied here, actors’ envisioning of the business problems, 
technology solutions and organisational practices was not simply an outcome of the 
implementation process, as suggested by cultural studies of IT, but played a key role in shaping 
the focus and outcomes of the project. Actors’ emerging visions of the organisational application 
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of IT act as an intermediary (mezzo level) between multiple logics (the macro level) and actors’ 
coping responses (the micro level) in shaping the outcome of and the process involved in the 
implementation as the project unfolds. Importantly, this study highlights the pivotal role played 
by the type of task involved during implementation stages, which focuses directs the attention on 
different components of the actors’ emerging vision as the implementation unfolds. 
Existing IS research also suggests that variation in actors’ responses arises due to the varying 
levels of authority of different organisational actors that exist across a project’s lifetime (Standing 
et al., 2009) and the degree of congruence between logics themselves (Berente et al., 
forthcoming). However, it says little about what could explain such variation when the level of 
authority and the tensions between logics remain similar, as was the case in this study. Here, the 
dissonance between actors’ perceptions of the different components of the organising vision 
(business problematic, core technology, organisational practices) explained their coping 
strategies. These were acquiescence in the case of great cohesion (at comprehension), 
compromise when dissonance first appeared (at adoption), and the whole repertoire of responses 
ranging from avoidance to manipulation as the dissonance between expectations deepened and 
misalignments became more obvious (at implementation). Thus, these findings not only explain 
why conflicting visions of technology emerge between different groups of actors (Abubakre et 
al., 2017) but also elucidate their consequences as the project unfolds. They also reveal the role 
played by congruence within the vision of the same group of actors, as much as congruence 
among the visions held by different actors (e.g. Abubakre et al., 2017; Currie, 2004; Swanson 
and Ramiller, 1997) in shaping IT adoption and implementation. Organising vision thus emerges 
as a useful concept for investigating how actors cope with institutional complexity in large-scale 
digital transformation projects by delineating the different aspects of such technology 
implementation projects (scope of application, technology and practices) that require alignment 




The struggle to cope with tensions between multiple logics, and the difficulties involved in 
aligning diverse and shifting interpretations of the technology across diverse groups of actors, 
characterise many IT implementation projects in complex settings (e.g. Berente and Yoo, 2012; 
Currie, 2012). This analysis demonstrates how actors’ efforts to cope with complex IT 
implementation initiatives result from the interaction between the multiple institutional logics 
guiding their behaviour and their shifting interpretations and expectations of the projects’ 
objectives, technological scope and required actions (‘organising vision’) as the implementation 
project unfolds and changes in the nature of the task at hand.  While other research has pointed 
to the role of institutional logics and tensions between actors’ interpretations in shaping IT 
implementation process and outcomes (e.g. Abubakre et al., 2017; Berente et al., forthcoming), 
this analysis is unique in three main ways. Firstly, by showing how the relative influence of 
different logics (here, public sector, corporate, professional) and elements of the organising vision 
can change as the nature of key task changes during project’s progression from comprehension 
to implementation. Secondly, by demonstrating the importance of coherence of visions within 
groups of actors as well as between them. Thirdly by revealing how actors’ visions of a project’s 
business problem, technology solution and organisational practices shape their coping responses 
to institutional complexity during IT implementation.  
The study contributes to current institutional IS research which sees the actors involved in 
technology implementation projects as active players who can interpret institutional expectations 
and strategically act upon these interpretations to shape the project, rather than being passive 
followers of institutional templates for action (e.g. Berente et al., forthcoming; Orlikowski and 
Barley, 2001). We move beyond current IS research that explains actors’ behaviour during IT 
implementation as arising from institutional complexity (e.g. degree of congruence between 
logics (Berente et al., forthcoming), level of authority (Standing et al., 2009), or pattern of 
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socialisation (Boonstra et al., 2017). Instead, the findings highlight the role played by actors’ 
“organising vision” (collective interpretation of a new technology introduced within their 
organisation) in shaping their coping responses, and how these responses can influence the 
processes and outcomes of IT implementation projects in complex institutional settings. 
These findings also have implications for policy and practice. Large-scale digital transformation 
projects are taking place worldwide, often at great expense. The institutional complexity 
characterising modern organisational settings helps to explain why such projects often experience 
difficulties (Currie, 2012). Effective planning and management of such projects may be aided by 
understanding how this complexity can shape actors’ responses, and how to ensure that the 
organising vision for the innovation is universally understood, cohesive and stable over time.  
This study finds that there is a need to account not only for differing institutional logics, but also 
their changing influence as the project progress through stages and actors’ attention is directed 
onto different aspects of the organising vision. These results illustrate the need to recognise these 
changes and seek alignment before conflicting viewpoints become entrenched.  
The study is not without limitations. It focuses on the project stages up to and including 
implementation and does not consider how the interplay between logics and actors’ responses 
shaped the outcomes of the programme after the system had been fully rolled out. The analysis 
considers only one organisation (albeit comprising many regional organisations) in one sector 
(healthcare), hence the specific relations observed here between logics, organising vision and 
responses may not necessarily be transferable to other settings. For example, it is unlikely that all 
implementation projects will experience the same increase in response variety over time, while 
institutional logics will vary with context (for example, the public sector logic found here, is 
unlikely to apply in industry). A fruitful avenue for future research would be to explore the 
applicability of the framework to other settings outside healthcare, both in the public and private 
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sectors, as well as to consider how the level and stability of coherence within the organising 
vision shapes the success of digital transformation projects throughout their use.   
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Table 4. Respondents 
Organization/Team Respondents Code Involved since 
Central HRIS team National Project Team Respondents R1, R2, R3 Comprehension 
eHealth Division eHealth Respondent R4 Implementation 
Procurement Team Senior Procurement Respondent R5 Adoption 
Vendor Key Project Participants 
R6 Adoption 
R7 Implementation 
System Supplier Key Project Participant R8 Not available 
RHO 1 Senior HR Executive R9 Adoption 
RHO 2 Senior HR Executive R10 Comprehension 
RHO 3 
Senior HR Executive  R11 Comprehension 
Implementation Team Member R12 Implementation 
HR Professional R13 Implementation 
RHO 4 Senior HR Executive R14 Adoption 
RHO 5 HR Professionals R15, R16 Adoption 
RHO 6 
Senior HR Executive R17 Adoption 
HR Professionals R18, R19 Implementation 
RHO 7 
Senior HR Executive R20 Implementation 
HR Professionals R21, R22, R23, R24 Implementation 
Manager User R25 Implementation 
RHO 8 
Senior HR Executive R26 Comprehension 
Implementation Team Members R27, R28, R29, R30 Implementation 
Employee User R31 Implementation 
 
Table 5. List of documentation 
Publicly available information concerning the NHO & HRIS project 
[Country] eHealth strategy 
NHO website 
Project website 




HRIS project specific documentation  
Workforce information systems strategy report 
[HRIS] eHealth outline business case 
[HRIS] eHealth project. Standard business case 
[Country] Workforce information strategic system. Short term solution–phase 1&2 implementation proposal 
[HRIS] Services specification 
Project Gantt chart 
Procurement documentation (e.g. invitation to tender documentation, pre-qualification questionnaire) 
End of [HRIS] pilot national implementation board report [commissioned in 2014] 
Pilot project. iRecruitment review report 
Pilot project. Using [HRIS] – lessons learned report 
RHOs [HRIS] local implementation plans 
System training materials (e.g. [HRIS] Self service awareness session, employee quick reference guide) 
 
 
